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Abstract—In OpenFlow, control and data plane are decoupled
from switches/routers. Direct programming of routers/switches is
realised from one or more servers (so called controllers). In the
case of an in-band OpenFlow network, the control traffic (traffic
to or from the controllers) is sent on the same channel used to
transport data traffic. Therefore, when a failure occurs along the
data traffic path, both control and data traffic can be affected.
This paper explains how failure recovery can be deployed in such
a network. To achieve carrier-grade quality, the network should
be able to recover from the failure within 50 ms. We apply two
well-known recovery mechanisms -restoration and protection- for
the control and the data traffic, and run extensive emulation
experiments. The emulation results show that restoration does
not allow to recover within 50 ms. Moreover, the restoration of
the control traffic delays the restoration of the data traffic. The
emulation results also show that protection for both control and
data traffic can meet the carrier-grade recovery requirement,
even in a large-scale network serving many flows.
I. INTRODUCTION
A standard switch/router comes with the functionality to
support all standard protocols. However, a switch uses only
some of them. This makes the design extremely inefficient,
complex, and expensive. Moreover, it constraints innovation
opportunities for network operators, researchers and vendors.
This problem is addressed by OpenFlow [1] by separating con-
trol and data plane. It removes the control plane functionality
from the switches and embeds it into one or more servers called
controllers, and hence makes switches inexpensive. In addition,
this imparts network flexibility, as the control functionality is
moved to the controllers, while only forwarding is required
to be done in hardware. Any added functionality can be
implemented seamlessly by programming the controllers.
OpenFlow [1] is developed in a clean-slate future internet
program by Stanford University, which aims to offer a pro-
grammable network to test new protocols in current Internet
platforms. The core idea of OpenFlow is to provide direct
programming of a router or switch to monitor and modify
the way in which packets are handled by the device. It is
based on the fact that most modern routers/switches con-
tain a proprietary FIB (Forwarding Information Base) which
is implemented in the forwarding hardware using TCAMs
(Ternary Content Addressable Memory). OpenFlow provides
the concept of FlowTable that is an abstraction of the FIB.
Additionally, it provides a protocol to program the FIB via
adding/deleting/modifying entries in the FlowTable. This is
achieved by one or more controllers that communicate with
OpenFlow switches using the OpenFlow protocol (Fig. 1).
The switch/router that exposes its FlowTables through the
OpenFlow protocol is called an OpenFlow switch/router.
An entry in the FlowTable consists of: (1) a set of packet
fields to match with incoming packets (called as flow), (2)
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statistics which keep track of matching packets per flow, and
(3) actions which define how packets should be processed.
When a packet arrives at an OpenFlow switch, it is compared
with the Flow Entries in the FlowTable. If a match is found,
the actions specified in the matching entry are performed. If
no match is found, the packet (a part thereof) is forwarded
to the controller. Thereafter, the controller makes a decision
on how to handle the packet. It may return the packet to the
switch indicating the forwarding port, or it may add a Flow
Entry directing the switch on how to forward packets with the
same flow.
One of the European projects named SPARC (SPlit ARchi-
tecture Carrier-Grade Networks) [2] examined how networks
with carrier-grade requirements can benefit from OpenFlow.
These networks support hundreds of thousands of customers
and require extremely high availability, while allowing a
maximum disruption time of 50 ms [3]. A disruption of
communication can cause a significant loss in activity, cus-
tomers, and corresponding revenue. In fact, there is a service
level agreement between the business customer and a service
provider to deliver a high available service. If a network
operator is unable to meet the agreement, it has to compensate
for the loss of service.
To achieve carrier-grade quality in OpenFlow networks,
both control and data traffic should recover from a failure
within 50 ms. Failure recovery is important for both data and
control traffic, as the loss in data traffic causes a disruption
of service, while loss in control traffic prevents any new flow
establishment from the switches affected by the failure.
To meet recovery requirements, we study restoration and
protection for OpenFlow networks. OpenFlow networks can
be in-band or out-of-band. In the case of an in-band network,
control traffic (traffic to or from the controller) is sent on the
same channel used to transport data traffic (Fig. 1A), whereas
in the case of an out-of-band network, control traffic is sent
on a different channel (Fig. 1B). The out-of-band network is
expensive to build due to the requirement of an extra physical
port on each switch. However, in the in-band network, there
is no need of an extra physical port on each switch. Traffic
to or from the controller can be directed via an OpenFlow
network (see Fig. 1A). In [4], [5], [6], [7], we performed failure
recovery experiments in the out-of-band OpenFlow network,
where we emulated restoration and protection mechanisms for
data traffic.
In this paper, we focus on failure recovery mechanisms for
the in-band OpenFlow network, where we propose restoration
and protection techniques for control traffic, while utilizing the
previously proposed restoration and protection mechanisms of
the out-of-band network for data traffic. We perform an ex-
tensive failure recovery experiment, and show that restoration
does not recover traffic within 50 ms. Moreover, the restoration
of control traffic delays the restoration of data traffic. The
emulation results also show that protection for both control and
data traffic can meet the carrier-grade recovery requirement,
even in a large-scale network serving many flows.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2
presents network recovery, Section 3 describes the emulation
environment, Section 4 presents results, and finally section 5
concludes.
II. NETWORK RECOVERY
Network recovery is a general term for any actions that en-
able a network to return to an operational state after a network
failure. We first describe failure recovery mechanisms that are
used in networks supporting carrier-grade quality. Then, we
describe integration of those mechanisms in OpenFlow in order
to recover within a ms interval.
For carrier-grade quality, failure recovery is generally
achieved by first designing a network topology with failures
in mind in order to provide alternate paths. The next step is
adding the ability to detect failures and react to them using
proper recovery mechanisms.
Loss of Signal (LOS) and Bidirectional Forwarding Detec-
tion (BFD) [9] are widely used to detect failures. LOS can
detect failures in one particular port of the forwarding device,
whereas BFD detects failures in the path between any two
forwarding devices. BFD is a simple Hello protocol and in
many aspects is similar to the detection components of many
routing protocols such as OSPF (Open Shortest Path First).
A pair of systems (end-to-end devices) transmits BFD packets
periodically between each other, and if a system stops receiving
BFD packets, the forwarding path between the neighboring
systems is assumed to have failed.
After failure detection, traffic towards a faulty path is
redirected to a fault-free path by using recovery mechanisms.
Recovery mechanisms to deliver carrier-grade quality can be
divided into two categories: restoration and protection [8].
In the case of restoration, recovery paths can be either pre-
planned or dynamically allocated, but resources required by
recovery paths are not allocated until a failure occurs. Thus,
when the failure occurs, additional signaling is required to es-
tablish the restoration path. However, in the case of protection,
recovery paths are always pre-planned and reserved before the
failure occurs. Hence, when the failure occurs, no additional
signaling is needed to establish the protection path, traffic can
be immediately redirected. Restoration is therefore a reactive
strategy, and protection is therefore a proactive strategy. There
are different protection schemes depending on the number of
recovery paths that are established for a given number of
working paths. These are 1 + 1, 1 : 1, 1 : N(N > 1) and
M : N [8].
A. Failure recovery for OpenFlow networks
Failures can be detected in OpenFlow by LOS. It causes a
port to change to the “down” state from the “up” state. When
there is a change in the state of a port, an OpenFlow switch
sends a notification message to the controller that is called a
port-status message [10]. This mechanism detects only link-
local failures and may be used in restoration. However, for
path protection, end-to-end failure detection in any path in the
forwarding switches is required. Therefore, we used BFD in
the case of protection.
In [6], we focused on out-of-band OpenFlow networks,
where we addressed the challenges of restoration and pro-
tection of only data traffic. For in-band networks, however,
control traffic is sent along the same channel as data traffic, and
thereby the restoration and protection mechanisms addressing
both control and data traffic have to be investigated.
Nevertheless, OpenFlow describes recovery of control traf-
fic. When control traffic of a switch is affected by a failure, the
switch loses communication with the controller. The switch,
then, tries to establish a new connection (e.g. TCP) with
the controller after an echo request timeout [12]. If it fails
to do so, it waits for a backoff timeout and again tries to
establish a connection with the controller. The switch repeats
the same process on each failure. As the minimum value of
the echo request and the backoff timeouts are 1 second [12],
failure recovery by this mechanism cannot be achieved in milli-
second. Therefore, we propose restoration and protection for
fast recovery of control traffic in the in-band network.
The following subsections describe restoration and protec-
tion mechanisms for in-band OpenFlow networks.
1) Restoration of control traffic: The challenge behind
implementing restoration of control traffic is that the controller
has to establish a restoration path from the switches with which
it has lost the connection. This can be explained with Fig. 1A.
Assuming a failure occurs on link BC of the topology shown
in Fig. 1A, the control traffic path between switch C and the
controller is affected. Now the controller needs to establish
the restoration paths < SADC > and < CDAS >. Path
< SADC > is for the controller to switch C communication,
and path < CDAS > is for switch C to the controller
communication. Establishment of new path means sending the
necessary messages to modify or add the Flow Entries in
switches. These messages are called flow-mod messages. As
the connection between switch C and the controller is lost by
the failure on link BC, switch C will not be able to receive the
flow-mod messages from the controller, which are required to
establish the restoration paths < SADC > and < CDAS >.
If the controller tries to send the flow-mod messages to
switch C from switch D via link DC, it cannot be guaranteed
that the full flow-mod message will be received by the affected
switch C. This is because of segmentation done by the TCP
protocol, which can segment a flow-mod message, leading to
reception of only the first segment of the flow-mod message.
However, since the new path (< CDAS >) is still not estab-
lished, switch C still uses the faulty connection (< CBAS >)
to send the acknowledgement of the first segment of the flow-
mod message, which will not be received by the controller.
And thereby, the controller will keep on retransmitting the first
segment, and the full flow-mod message will never be received
by switch C.
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Fig. 2. Control plane failure recovery
Considering the above situations, we propose control traffic
restoration for an in-band OpenFlow network. Control traffic
restoration can be seen in Fig. 2A in which A, B, C and D
are the OpenFlow switches and S is the controller. Assuming
the controller knows the topology. Therefore, in the initial
phase, the controller can calculate paths < CBAS > and
< SABC > for switch C to the controller communication
and for the controller to switch C communication respectively.
For path < CBAS >, the Flow Entries are added in switches
C, B, A and D such that switch C floods its own control traffic
(traffic generated by it), the neighbor switch B forwards this
traffic to switch A, the neighbor switch D drops this traffic, and
switch A forwards this to the controller (S). In addition, for
path < SABC >, the Flow Entries are added in switches A,
B and C such that switch A forwards this to switch B, switch
B forwards this to switch C, and switch C forwards this to
itself. Note that the incoming port of a packet is not assumed
to be the part of the flow. Therefore, the Flow Entry in switch
C for path < SABC > will allow switch C to receive traffic
from switch D after a failure on link BC.
When the failure occurs on link BC, switch B and switch
C send the port-status message to the controller. The port-
status message of switch C drops due to the failure in link
BC, whereas the port-status message of switch B reaches to
the controller. On reception of the port-status message, the
controller updates the topology and calculates the restoration
paths (< SADC > and < CDAS >). Path < SADC > is
calculated for the controller to switch C communication and
path < CDAS > is calculated for switch C to the controller
communication.
As the flow in the Flow Entry of switch A for the working
path < SABC > and the restoration path < SADC > is
identical but the action is different (i.e. to forward to switch B
or D), the controller modifies the Flow Entry at switch A. In
addition, as there is no Flow Entry installed in D in the initial
setup for < SADC >, the controller adds the corresponding
Flow Entry in switch D. Since the incoming port of traffic is
not assumed to be the part of the matching header in Flow
Entries, the controller does not modify or add the Flow Entry
in switch C for the restoration path < SADC >. Furthermore,
as switch C floods it own traffic, the controller does not need to
modify the Flow Entry in switch C to establish the restoration
path < CDAS >.
Now for the restoration path < CDAS >, the controller
modifies the Flow Entry at switch D to forward control traffic
of switch C to switch A (instead of dropping). For switch A, as
the flow and the action of the Flow Entry for the restoration
path (< CDAS >) and the faulty path (< CBAS >) is
same, the controller does not modify the Flow Entry at switch
A. After establishing the restoration paths (< SADC > and
< CDAS >), the controller now completes the activity of
failure recovery for switch C.
In the topology shown in Fig. 1A, if a failure occurs on
link AB (instead of the link BC), the control traffic paths of
two switches, switch B and switch C, are affected. We assume
that the controller has established the working paths for switch
B similar to switch C, cf. Fig. 2A. As restoration for switch B
requires establishment of the restoration paths (< SADCB >
and < BCDAS >) through switch C, the controller should
restore first the control traffic of switch C before trying to
restore switch B. However, the controller does not know when
the restoration activity of switch C will complete. To know
this, we use the barrier-request and reply messages concept,
which is specified in OpenFlow specifications [10]. Therefore,
the controller sends the barrier request messages to switch A
and switch D after sending all flow-mod messages to them
(restoration activity for switch C). After sending the barrier
request messages, the controller waits to start the restoration
activity of switch B until it receives the barrier-reply messages
from switch A and switch D. These barrier-reply messages
ensure that the restoration activity of switch C has completed.
2) Protection of control traffic: In the time between failure
detection and the completion of restoration, traffic may be lost.
In order to further reduce the traffic loss resulting from delay
in the restoration action, we can turn to protection. Protection
removes the need of the OpenFlow switches to contact the
controller for modification and addition of the Flow Entries
to establish the alternative path. This can be accomplished by
pre-computing the protection path and establishing it together
with the working path. In 1+1 protection, traffic is duplicated at
both the working and the protection path, and in 1:1 protection,
traffic is transmitted to the protection path upon the failure at
the working path. Protection allows fast recovery but requires
a larger FlowTable.
Our approach of implementing protection of the control
traffic in in-band OpenFlow networks is similar to protection
of data traffic in out-of-band OpenFlow networks (described
in [6]). In this approach, the GroupTable concept specified for
OpenFlow in its version 1.1 [11] is used to switch traffic to an
alternative path. In the GroupTable concept, a Flow Entry in
the FlowTable points packets to one of the Group Entries of the
GroupTable. Each Group Entry consists of a number of action
buckets. OpenFlow introduces the fast-failover type [11] of a
Group Entry in order to switch traffic to an alternative path
without needing to involve the controller. This group type is
important for our protection mechanism. Any group entry of
this type consists of two or more action buckets with a well-
defined order. A bucket is considered alive if its associated
alive status is within a specific range (i.e. watch port or
watch group is not equal to 0xffffffffL). The first action bucket
describes what to do with the packet under normal conditions.
If this action bucket has been declared as unavailable that is
due to change in the status of the bucket (i.e 0xffffffffL), the
packet is treated according to the next available bucket. The
status of the bucket can be changed by the monitored port
going into the “down” state or through other mechanisms such
as BFD. For protection, we used BFD for this purpose.
1:1 path protection for control traffic of switch C can be
seen in Fig. 2B. In Fig. 2B, the working path < SABC >
and the protection path < SADC > are established for
the controller to switch C communication. In addition, for
switch C to the controller communication, the working path
< CBAS > and the protection path < CDAS > are
established. The paths are established by adding the Flow
Entries and the Group Entries in the switches. The OpenFlow
switches A and C are the switches in Fig. 2B, which need to
take the switching action on failure conditions. For switch A,
the action is to send the packets generated by the controller
to switch B during the normal condition and to switch D
during the failure condition. For switch C, the action is to
send the packets generated by it to switch B during the normal
condition and to switch D during the failure condition. For
these particular flows of packets in switch A and switch C,
the GroupTable concept is applied.
The Group Entry in switch A and switch C, therefore,
contains two action buckets: one for output port B and the other
for output port D. Other than these entries, the corresponding
Flow Entries can be added in the respective switches for the
working and the protection paths. Once a failure is detected
by BFD in switch A and switch C for the working paths
< SABC > and < CABS > respectively, switch A and
switch C modify the alive status of the first bucket in the
corresponding Group Entry. Thus, the action related to the
next bucket, whose output port is D (in the case of switch A
and switch C), can be taken. As the Flow Entries in switches
D and C related to path < SADC >, and the Flow Entries
in switches D and A related to path < CDAS > are already
present, there is no need to install these entries upon failure.
3) Restoration and protection of data traffic: For restora-
tion and protection of data traffic, we used the same mechanism
as described in [6]. In the case of restoration, an alternative
path is established by adding and modifying Flow Entries in
the switches of the alternative path. However, in [6], failures
in the control traffic are not considered. In order to establish
the alternative path for data traffic, failure recovery of control
traffic is important. This is because the alternative path cannot
be established using the switches with which the controller has
lost the connection. Therefore, before restoring data traffic, we
established the control traffic paths between the controller and
the affected switches of the alternative path.
For protection of data traffic, an alternative path is estab-
lished before occurrence of a failure. When the failure occurs
in the working path, the ingress OpenFlow switch redirects
traffic to the alternative path by the GroupTable concept [11].
As the controller does not participate in recovery of data traffic,
failure recovery in control traffic does not affect protection of
data traffic.
III. EMULATION ENVIRONMENT
In this section, we describe testbed, topologies, and
methodology used for experiments.
A. Emulation testbed and topologies
We performed emulation on our virtual-wall testbed which
is a generic test environment for advanced network, distributive
software and service evaluation. The testbed consists of 100
physical nodes interconnected by a non-blocking 1.5 Tb/s
Force10 Ethernet switch. Each node in the testbed has 24 CPU
cores and 24 GB RAM.
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Mininet tool [13] can create topologies in a single node
by using Linux process in different network namespace. We
used this tool to create a German backbone network topology
(shown in Fig. 3) in our testbed node. In Fig. 3, each switch of
the German backbone topology is connected to a server, and
the Hamburg switch is directly connected to the controller.
To assign a separate CPU core to the controller and to each
switch, we bounded a different core of our testbed node to the
controller and to each switch of the topology.
B. Emulation methodology
In our emulation, each server generated data packets to all
other servers in the topology shown in Fig. 3. Each server in
our emulation sent data packets with five different flows to all
other servers at the constant interval of 6 ms. There were a
total of 910 flows in the network. To transmit the packets, we
manually configured the routing table and the ARP table in
each server.
There are many extensions of the OpenFlow protocol.
Some of the extensions have been released publicly in the
form of OpenFlow versions. In April 2012, the OpenFlow
version 1.3 has been released by ONF (Open Networking
Foundation). In addition, many OpenFlow controllers are also
available for controlling OpenFlow networks. These are NOX,
Beacon, Onix, Helios, Maestro and Floodlight. We imple-
mented restoration and protection in the NOX controller and
the OpenFlow version 1.1 (developed by Ericsson [14]), and
used these for our emulation.
For detecting failures in the protection case, each working
path was monitored by adding an additional BFD flow in
the OpenFlow switches. The BFD process transmits a failure
notification message when it detects a failure. To receive the
failure notification message from the BFD process, a virtual
link (the link veth1 - veth2 in Fig. 4) has been created
between the OpenFlow switch process and the BFD process.
Furthermore, an alias of the OpenFlow port (eth1:1) has been
created for the BFD process to be able to receive the packets
from the OpenFlow port (eth1). The BFD failure detection
time in the experiment was between 40 to 44 ms. For the
restoration case, we did not establish a BFD session. In this
case, the OpenFlow switches detected a failure when LOS was
declared by a port as a “port down” event.
For restoration and protection of both control and data
traffic, we performed four different experiments:
1) Restoration experiment: In this experiment, restora-
tion was performed on both control and data traffic.
2) Protection-Restoration experiment: In this experi-
ment, protection was performed on control traffic and
restoration was performed on data traffic
3) Restoration-Protection experiment: In this experi-
ment, restoration was performed on control traffic and
protection was performed on data traffic.
4) Protection experiment: In this experiment, protection
was performed on both control and data traffic.
In each of the above experiments, one of the links between
the switches was broken and the recovery time was calculated.
We use the NOX traffic intensity in all the above ex-
periments to illustrate our experimental setup. Fig. 5A, Fig.
5B, Fig. 5C and Fig. 5D show the NOX traffic intensity
of the restoration, the protection-restoration, the restoration-
protection, and the protection experiment respectively.
In our emulation, each switch in the German topology
establishes first an OpenFlow session with the controller by the
algorithm implemented in [15]. The traffic intensity shown at
the begining of the experiment (at the -200 to -168 seconds Fig.
5) is due to traffic generated to establish OpenFlow sessions
with the controller. There is a large spike at -168 seconds
in Fig. 5, shown by (1). This is the time in our emulation
when the controller established control traffic paths for control
traffic. The height of the spike shown by (1) is more in
Fig. 5B and Fig. 5D than in Fig. 5A and Fig. 5C. This is
because the protection paths were established together with
the working paths in both the protection-restoration and the
protection experiment.
At (2) in Fig. 5, there are 14 spikes (from -150 to -124
seconds) after each two-second interval. These spikes are due
to data traffic from the switches to learn the path to the
destination. The interval of two-second between the spikes
occured, because we have started sending data traffic waiting
two-second between each server. The two-second interval was
used to avoid overloading the NOX controller as the switches
can try to establish too many flows in a short time span. These
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spikes in Fig. 5C and Fig. 5D are higher than the spikes in Fig.
5A and Fig. 5B because protection of data traffic establishes
an alternative path together with the working path.
At (3), there is no spike in Fig. 5A, there is one spike in Fig.
5B, and there are 14 spikes (from -100 to -74 seconds) in Fig.
5C and Fig. 5D. These are the spikes due to BFD traffic. As
in the restoration experiment, neither control nor data traffic
are protected, we did not establish any BFD session in this
experiment. We, therefore, do not see any spike at (3) in Fig.
5A. In the case of the protection-restoration experiment, as
control traffic needs to be protected on the failure condition, we
established BFD sessions between Hamburg (c.f. Fig. 3) and
all other switches. This is shown by the one large spike at (3) in
Fig. 5B. However, as data traffic in the case of the restoration-
protection experiment, and both data and control traffic in
the case of protection experiment need to be protected, we
established BFD session between each switch to all the other
switches in these experiments. These are shown by 14 spikes
at (3) in Fig. 5C and Fig. 5D.
There are also small spikes periodically in Fig. 5. These
are due to the echo messages that were sent to check aliveness
of the control traffic paths. The height and the number of these
spikes are different in all the performed experiments. This
was due to the minor time difference between the start of the
experiments. At the 0 second (shown by (4)), we have failed
the Hamburg-Berlin link (see Fig. 3) by disabling the Ethernet
interface at Hamburg and Berlin. When the OpenFlow switches
(Hamburg and Berlin) detected this failure, the port-status
message was sent to the controller. Since the control traffic
path of Berlin failed by the failure, the port-status of Berlin
drops. However, when the port-status message of Hamburg
reaches to the controller, the controller starts recovery actions.
In the case of restoration, the controller sends the necessary
messages to establish a new path. In the case of protection,
the controller does not send any message to any switch to
establish the new path on a failure condition because it has
already established it before the failure occured.
Sending messages to the switches give the spike at the
controller traffic. As a result, because restoration is applied
for both data and control traffic in the restoration experiment,
the spike at 0 second is larger in Fig. 5A than in Fig. 5B and
Fig. 5C. However, as protection is applied for both data and
control traffic in the protection experiment, there is no spike
at 0 second in Fig. 5D.
IV. EMULATION RESULTS
We now show the results of the experiments in which link
Hamburg-Berlin was failed in the emulated German topology.
Fig. 6 shows traffic at link Hamburg-Berlin (from -0.4 to 0.4
second), which was captured at the Hamburg switch. As the
port at Hamburg and Berlin was disabled at 0 second, the
Hamburg switch stopped transmitting/receiving packets at this
link after 0 second. This is shown by Fig. 6.
Fig. 7 shows traffic on link Hamburg-Bremen (see Fig.
3). After link Hamburg-Berlin was taken down, this was the
only link connecting Hamburg. Therefore, after failure, all
traffic from and towards Hamburg must follow link Hamburg-
Bremen. At the time of the link failure, we see a small drop in
total traffic on this link. This was due to the loss in traffic which
was coming from link Berlin-Hamburg over Hamburg-Bremen
before the failure. This is shown from 0 to 0.050 second in
Fig. 7A and Fig. 7B, from 0 to 0.040 second in Fig. 7C and
7D. After this drop, there is a sudden increase in total traffic
at the link Bremen-Hamburg. In Fig. 7A and Fig. 7B, this was
due to the restoration activity of the controller whereas, in Fig.
7C, this was due to the restoration and the protection activity,
and in Fig. 7D, this was due to the protection activity.
In Fig. 7A, there is a small decrease in total traffic (0.050
to 0.070 second) after the sudden increase, followed by a
stepwise increase (from 0.070 to 0.140 second) and a sudden
decrease at 0.150 second. After 0.150 second, total traffic
becomes approximately double to the amount it was before
the failure. This was the time in the restoration experiment
when the controller has completed the recovery action for both
control and data traffic.
In Fig. 7B, after the sudden increase, there is a stepwise
increase in traffic (from 0.050 to 0.120 second), followed by
a sudden decrease at 0.130 second. After 0.130 second, total
traffic becomes approximately double to the amount it was
before failure. In Fig. 7A, this time is 0.150 second. Hence,
in the restoration experiment (Fig. 7A), total recovery took
20 ms more time than the protection-restoration experiment
(Fig. 7B). The only difference between these two experiments
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Fig. 8. Recovery times (data traffic and control traffic)
is that in former, restoration is applied to control traffic and
in latter, protection is applied to control traffic. Therefore, we
can say that the restoration of control traffic in the restoration
experiment has delayed the total recovery time by 20 ms.
In Fig. 7C, after the sudden increase, there is a sudden
decrease in traffic at 0.080 second and then total traffic
becomes approximately equal to double to the amount it was
before the failure. However, in Fig. 7D, after sudden increase,
total traffic becomes approximately double at about 0.050
second. Therefore, in the protection experiment, total recovery
(both data and control traffic) took approximately 50 ms time.
Fig. 7 also shows the gap in traffic from Berlin when
the failure occured in link Hamburg-Berlin. The gap shows
disruption in data traffic at the time of the failure condition.
We performed link failure experiments on all the links
indicated by a number in Fig. 3 (the number is the ID of the
link). The results of the experiments are depicted in Fig. 8. The
x-axis shows the ID of the broken links, the number of affected
flows, the number of switches whose control traffic paths are
affected by the failure (number of affected switches). The links
in x-axis are ordered left to right according to the number of
affected flows. The y-axis shows the failure detection time,
and the recovery time for both control and data traffic. In
the case of restoration of control traffic, the recovery time is
calculated as the difference of the time when the failure was
given and the controller received all barrier-reply messages for
the restoration activity of all affected switches. In the case of
restoration of data traffic, the recovery time is calculated as
the difference of the time when the failure was given and all
flow-mod messages were processed in the network. In the case
of protection, the recovery time is calculated as the difference
of the time when the failure was given and all affected Group
Entries were modified.
Fig. 8A shows that the recovery time of data traffic does
not vary linearly with the increased number of affected flows.
This is because the number of affected switches (restoration
of control traffic) has inserted additional delay to the recovery
of data traffic. In Fig. 8B, the recovery time varies linearly
with the increased number of affected flows. This is because
protection of control traffic has not inserted any additional
delay in our experiment. In Fig. 8C and Fig. 8D, however,
the recovery time of data traffic is constant with the increased
number of affected flows. This is because we established a
maximum of 13 group entries (per switch) for all the flows
in the network, and modification of these number of entries
has taken less than 1 ms time (i.e. O(n) time where n is the
number of affected group entries). Therefore, in our results, we
see that the traffic in protection recovered immediately after
detecting the failure. Hence, the traffic for which we performed
protection, recovery met the carrier-grade requirement of 50
ms, and for the traffic we did not perform protection, recovery
did not meet the carrier-grade requirement.
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Fig. 9. Control traffic recovery time
The above experiments do not show how the restoration
time of control traffic varies with the number of affected
switches along the recovery path. The emulated German
topology is a mesh topology in which it is difficult to have
the increased number of affected switches in the recovery
path. Therefore, to show the comparison, we performed a link
failure experiment on the ring topology of 70 switches. The
results of the experiment are shown in Fig. 9. The results
show that the restoration time varies linearly with the increased
number of affected switches along the recovery path. However,
in the case of protection, we do not see dependence on the
number of affected switches in the protection path (Fig. 9). It
is approximately constant for all number of affected switches
and meets the carrier-grade recovery requirement.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented restoration and protec-
tion for control and data traffic, and have performed failure
recovery experiments in an in-band OpenFlow network. It has
been shown that OpenFlow can restore traffic, but it does not
allow achieving 50 ms restoration in a large-scale network,
serving many flows. Moreover, the restoration of control traffic
delays the restoration of data traffic. The emulation results also
showed that protection for both control and data traffic can
meet the 50 ms requirement, even in a large-scale network
serving many flows.
In this paper, we did not consider situations where the
controller or switches themselves crash. In future work, we will
consider these situations, and will solve the controller crash
problem by using two controllers. Hence, when one controller
crashes, OpenFlow switches can rely on a backup controller
to take actions.
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